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INTRODUCTION 
The organizational network of global environmental governance (GEG) mirrors the 
complexity of the planet’s manifold and overlapping ecosystems. Bursting onto the 
international stage in the 1970s, environmental issues began to be addressed by a series of 
new international organizations, most of them affiliated with the United Nations. Some of 
them, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), were given a broad 
mandate, whereas others like the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) concentrated on 
a much more precise issue-area and have gained significant authority for their respective sub-
fields. After the end of the Cold War, the rise of international environmental organizations has 
continued unabated. Yet the new institutions came to life in an already institutionalized 
context: some of the urgent tasks of management and co-ordination had already been 
allocated, and the newcomers often contributed to a growing trend towards organizational 
fragmentation. 
For this chapter, we have adopted a broad and inclusive definition of international 
organization that is none the less distinguished from two other types of international 
institutions, namely what Keohane (1989: 4) describes as institutions with explicit rules 
(international regimes) and institutions with implicit rules (‘conventions’). In contrast, the 
organizations we study are bureaucratic actors and ‘purposive entities’ which are ‘capable of 
monitoring activity and of reacting to it’ and have been ‘deliberately set up and designed by 
states’ (ibid.: 3). They include not only fully-fledged ‘organizations’, but also UN 
commissions and programmes. Among the plethora of organizations with environment-related 
activities, we have restricted our analysis to those operating at the global level and have 
further selected those with either a clear environmental profile or a significant impact on 
global environmental governance. 
In addition to our leitmotif of organizational fragmentation – which evokes the image of a 
mosaic of institutional elements – we have also taken account of current debates over 
mainstreaming and sectoralization. Thus, many of the organizations reviewed in this chapter 
contain indications of the progress made towards a greater cross-sectoral integration of 
environmental concerns. For instance, the World Bank or the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) now routinely address environmental factors in their decision-making, 
albeit with variable sincerity. Such insights feed into our concluding analysis of future trends 
and perspectives for reforming the system of global environmental organizations. We begin 
our survey by describing a number of well-known global environmental conferences which 
provided the seedbed for the steady expansion of international environmental activities. 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS-SPONSORED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCES 
 
International organizations neither emerge from nor exist in a political vacuum and they 
commonly rely on national governments’ support for the negotiation and implementation of 
environmental agreements. However, the UN system, which accommodates the key globally 
operating environmental organizations, is clearly more than a simple ‘tool’ of its members; in 
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particular, the institutions or fora it initiates at times count as significant actors in their own 
right. As Bennett and Oliver (2002: 25–26) have observed, ‘[i]f environmental sensibilities 
and regulation have developed, the discourse that has produced them has occurred within a 
diplomatic and legal framework set by UN commissions and conferences over the last thirty-
odd years’. The progressive accumulation of norms, principles and action plans – commonly 
interpreted as elements of non-binding ‘soft’ law – began with the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) at Stockholm in 1972. Despite concerns from the developing 
world about potential implications for economic development (Imber 1996), the summit 
mostly dealt with ‘first-generation’ environmental problems such as point-source pollution. 
Apart from the creation of UNEP, Stockholm produced a detailed action plan of 
environmental measures, a political declaration of 26 principles, and gave a genuine impetus 
to national policy-makers, often leading to the formation of national environmental ministries 
(Chasek 2000: 3). 
By 1992, when Stockholm’s successor – the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) – was convened, the bipolar world had just come to an end. 
Optimism and a thirst for action were palpable at the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro and 
such feelings were not limited to the growing number of environmental NGOs that had come 
as observers. Moreover, ‘global environmental change,’ ventures Vogler (2007: 435), had ‘in 
some ways replaced fears of nuclear Armageddon.’ On a substantive level, the forceful 
emphasis of the global South on development issues, already visible in Stockholm, had left a 
deep imprint on the international agenda. Seeking to integrate the demands of environmental 
protection and socio-economic progress, the concept of sustainable development – 
popularized by the Brundtland Report in 1987 – arguably embodied the ‘central ideology of 
UNCED’ (Imber 1996: 139) and it pervaded the 27 principles contained in the Rio 
Declaration. In addition, negotiators produced the 
Agenda 21, a 700-page non-binding action plan that has since continued to guide 
environmental policy-making at all governmental levels (Chasek 2000: 4). The Commission 
on Sustainable Development (CSD) was tasked with reviewing the progress towards its goals. 
Finally, UNCED also created treaties on climate change and on biodiversity which spawned 
several important protocols in the ensuing years – the most famous being the Kyoto Protocol. 
With hindsight, UNCED’s two major environmental conventions – the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) – marked a shift towards greater governmental control: the secretariats of 
these newcomers could not match the relative independence of some earlier global 
environmental conventions, such as the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES). 
When the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) at Johannesburg went 
underway in the summer of 2002, much of Rio’s idealism had been exhausted. Developing 
countries were buoyed by the rising prominence of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The developed world, on the other hand, was affected by public apathy and 
increasing tension over both trade and environmental policies between the USA and the 
European Union. Talk of a new mobilizing idea—a ‘global deal’ between North and South – 
was quickly abandoned in favour of finding practical ways of implementing previous, 
unachieved commitments through ‘isolated delivery mechanisms’ (Bigg 2003). More 
emphasis than before was placed on public-private ‘type 2’ partnerships with a view to 
supplementing official development aid (ODA), but this was not matched by a binding code 
for corporate responsibility. The topics of trade and poverty eradication arguably stole the 
limelight from the title theme of sustainable development and reduced environmental 
considerations to a restatement of existing agreements (von Frantzius 2004). A political 
declaration and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPI) contained over 30 targets on 
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both development and environmental issues, yet specific instruments for implementation were 
largely absent (ibid.: 472). 
Overall, given the limited achievements of the WSSD, there is an unmistakable impression 
of ‘summit fatigue’ among both political actors and academic commentators. If the grand 
‘show-biz’ diplomacy of global summits is clearly flagging, it may be worth looking at the 
myriad ways in which the wider ‘UN environmental machinery’ (DeSombre 2006) has sought 
to tackle global environmental issues. One of the bodies set up to provide a more continuous 
organizational effort is the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. 
 
 
COMMISSION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (CSD) 
 
A brainchild of UNCED, the CSD began its life with high expectations. Steeped in the ‘spirit 
of Rio’ and entrusted with the global pursuit of sustainable development, the new body’s 
primary objective was to provide a follow-up to the summit’s priorities and review the 
implementation of Agenda 21. The CSD is constituted by 53 member states which serve 
three-year terms. Its status as a functional commission of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) does not endow it with specific powers or significant resources. Instead, 
it seeks to assist the sustainable  development agenda by making recommendations to the UN 
system (by reporting to ECOSOC), monitoring national reports on implementation, and 
organizing multi-stakeholder dialogues with major interest groups and government 
representatives. This systematic inclusion of civil society organizations is illustrated by a long 
list of accredited observers (3,000 in November 2001), among them hundreds of NGOs 
(Wagner 2005: 105). 
The crucial question to ask is whether the CSD has lived up to the hopes of its creators and 
whether its continued existence can be justified. Despite some patently useful work on 
freshwater and forests, influential ideas or a significant policy impacts have not been among 
its achievements. Its recommendations often resemble restatements of decisions made in other 
international fora and the underlying assumption that ‘if they talk about it, they will 
implement it’ has proved to be unfounded (ibid.: 118). Furthermore, over the years, the CSD’s 
agenda had become increasingly crowded and this frequently prevented a thorough discussion 
on the various propositions. 
Serious engagement with civil society organizations is the major innovation consistently 
mentioned by commentators. Yet, in the absence of a clear policy focus there have been 
successive attempts at improving the Commission’s performance. The 1997 reform of the 
CSD tried to streamline the agenda and remove some overlap with other UN fora, but only the 
improvements made after the 2002 WSSD review have brought about visible change. The 
CSD now observes a bi-annual negotiation cycle, with preparatory meetings in between 
remaining in a kind of ‘exploratory’ mode (ibid.: 112). While the leaner agenda and more 
modest ambition of ‘facilitating’ political and technical ‘learning’ have removed some overlap 
with other UN organizations (e.g. UNEP), it has not led to a ‘rebirth’ of the CSD as a major 
co-ordinator in the environmental field. The failure to reach agreement on climate change 
during the 15
th
 CSD session in May 2007 has documented this ongoing lack of leverage and 
appeal. Overall, the CSD's recent depoliticization – achieved through a greater emphasis on 
expert meetings and problem-solving in collaboration with industry groups and NGOs – has 
made the CSD a constructive, yet unobtrusive addition to the UN’s environmental machinery. 
The modest ambition behind the revamped CSD stands in marked contrast with the hopes 
invested in a strengthening of UNEP. 
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UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP) 
 
History 
UNEP is rightly seen as the core of environmental activities within the UN system. Its 35-year 
long history has been marked by a series of crises, notable achievements, and reorientations. 
A product of the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 
2997, the new agency (first headed by Maurice Strong) was essentially modelled on the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This arrangement was intended to match 
the ‘interdisciplinary and complex nature of environmental problems’ and accommodate a 
‘vast 
catalogue of recommended actions’ (Thomas 2004: 57–59). From the beginning, governments 
recognized the cross-cutting nature of environmental problems. UNEP’s status as programme 
rather than fully-fledged agency should thus not be read as a sign of early disregard or 
subordination (Ivanova 2005: 32). 
This form of organization, however, also meant that UNEP’s resources were being spread 
thinly across a whole range of issues. The Programme’s role as the UN’s environmental 
conscience – both co-ordinating and catalyzing global environmental activities – resulted in a 
broad selection of seven priority areas: human settlements and habitats (later turned into UN 
Habitat), human and environmental health, terrestrial ecosystems, environment and 
development, oceans, energy, and natural disasters (Downie and Levy 2000: 356). Following 
‘muscular’ but contested attempts at system-wide environmental co-ordination in the 1970s, 
UNEP came into its own in the early 1980s when it instituted the ‘Programme for the 
Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law’, also known as the ‘Montevideo 
Programme’. This decision cemented UNEP’s role in catalyzing and developing international 
environmental law. 
During the same period, UNEP was nevertheless becoming marginalized in other areas of 
environmental policy-making. The formation of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) appropriated much of its normative power and unique environmental 
mandate (Conca 1995). In response, UNEP produced the report ‘Environmental Perspectives 
to the Year 2000 and Beyond’ which proved to be an important influence on the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro (WRI 2003: 143). The conference itself, however, was not an 
unmitigated blessing for UNEP. It certainly ushered in a series of budget increases, but it also 
broadened the agency’s remit once again and agreed on the formation of the CSD. The 
availability of such alternative fora exacerbated the ensuing crisis in the mid-1990s (Wagner 
2005). Elizabeth Dowdeswell, who replaced the long-time Executive Director Mostafa Tolba 
in 1992, presided over a period in which many countries were losing confidence in UNEP’s 
capability. Its ambitious System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Programme (SWMTEP 
1990–95) was regarded as a ‘meaningless checklist’ or device for ‘turf-grabbing’ by many 
UN officials (Thomas 2004: 88). In 1997, matters came to a head when the USA, Britain, and 
Spain linked continued financial support to significant organizational reform (Karns and 
Mingst 2004: 476). The 1997 Nairobi Declaration broke the spell of decline and gave UNEP, 
headed by Klaus Töpfer from 1998–2006, a new lease of life. The new dynamism was further 
strengthened by the 2000 Malmö Declaration of environmental ministers – meeting as the 
Global Ministerial Environmental Forum (GMEF) for the first time – who sent out a strong 
message of concern in the run-up to the 2002 WSSD. 
In the new millennium, UNEP has been a highly visible component of GEG once again, 
not least due to a stabilizing budget and the debate over an upgrading of its status. Its fifth 
Executive Director Achim Steiner, who took office in June 2006, lauded his predecessor 
Töpfer for helping to ‘stabilize the organisation and expand its operations’ and pledged to 
continue on the basis of this legacy (UNEP 2007: 3). 
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Structure and Activities 
The Governing Council (GC) reviews UNEP’s progress and establishes its specific priorities. 
As UNEP is a Programme under the aegis of ECOSOC, the GC is expected to report to it 
directly. The GC’s 58 members are elected for four-year terms by the UN General Assembly 
according to a regional formula.
2
 The members meet annually and their decisions are best 
described as the driving force of UNEP’s overall legal and operational activities. This does 
not, however, always translate into a clear or consistent framework of priorities because 
member states often insist on their own preferred projects (Ivanova 2005: 22). During the 
remainder of the annual cycle, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), located in 
Nairobi, provides political guidance and monitoring. The organizational trinity is completed 
by the GMEF which has been convened 
since 2000 and is tasked with giving UNEP a stronger, long-term programmatic direction and 
political leadership. 
The day-to-day running of the organization is the business of the UNEP Secretariat in 
Kenya’s capital Nairobi and six regional offices around the world. UNEP has a comparatively 
small professional staff of just over 900 employees. Its annual budget is dwarfed by sister 
agencies like UNDP and reaches about US $260m.
3
 The annual core, ‘non-earmarked’ 
funding (known as the Environment Fund) has been hovering at just below $60m. during the 
past few years. Not having the capacity or funds of a genuine delivering agency, UNEP needs 
partnerships with NGOs and other international organizations if it wants to go beyond 
catalyzing and administrating international environmental law (Conca 1995). For instance, co-
operative projects have been conducted with the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 
on the atmosphere or with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) on freshwater quality (Karns and Mingst 2004). 
Overall, as Thomas (2004: 18) suggests, UNEP’s activities can be summarized by the ‘four 
Cs’ of compiling, convincing, catalyzing, and co-ordinating. The task of compilation is 
related to the agency’s original mission of representing a clearinghouse for environmental 
data and research at a time when such efforts were still in their infancy. Under a programme 
named ‘Earthwatch’, UNEP began to co-ordinate observation techniques and data analysis 
among all UN agencies as early as 1973. Through various dissemination mechanisms, such as 
the Global Environmental Information Exchange Network (INFOTERRA), the Global 
Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS), and its bi-annual flagship publication ‘Global 
Environmental Outlook’ (GEO), it has sought to maximize the impact of its scientific 
analyses. The second brief – convincing the world to take action – is closely linked to the 
vexed question of effectiveness, which is discussed below. Besides its scientific authority and 
management expertise, UNEP’s ‘most basic skill’ is diplomacy (Thomas 2004: 31). As a vital 
ingredient in the catalytic role, which has seen the agency assume the mantle of a leader or 
broker in particular negotiations, it determines the success or failure of attempts at 
mainstreaming new concepts. In this respect, it is worth recalling that UNEP had taken up the 
notion of ‘sustainable development’ in the early 1980s – even before it was popularized by the 
WCED in 1987. 
Finally, UNEP’s co-ordination mandate is generally seen as a disappointment. A 
succession of inter-agency bodies have been entrusted with the objective of achieving more 
system-wide programmatic coherence and with mainstreaming environmental goals. The 
latest incarnation, the Environment Management Group (EMG), has the unambitious task of 
identifying synergies in the UN system and commands only a minuscule resource base 
(Ivanova 2005: 29). 
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Evaluation 
The ineffectiveness of UNEP’s ‘Sisyphean’ co-ordination mandate (Imber 1996) appears to 
imply a negative judgement on its general performance. In what Imber considers a ‘feudal’ 
UN system with a weak centre and strong ‘baronial’ independent agencies, UNEP is 
continually emasculated and does not even have nominal authority over the environmental 
conventions it has helped to set up. Fruitful collaboration is surely a regular occurrence, but 
the idea of coordination assumes direct guidance from a lead agency. Frequently, however, 
UNEP represents a mere adjunct to existing projects: for instance, in providing organizational 
functions to particular multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or by acting as a 
scientific adviser to the dominant partners (World Bank, UNDP) in the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). Its subdued status has been weakened further by the creation of alternative 
fora, such as the CSD in 1992, and its politically desirable, but impractical location in Kenya 
– far away from the ‘corridor politics’ of UN hot spots in New York or Geneva. 
Of course, there are also more promising findings about UNEP’s performance, in particular 
with regard to its catalytic functions. The agency has excelled in its roles as ‘agreement 
facilitator’, ‘negotiation manager’, and ‘regime administrator’ (Downie 1995: 176). In line 
with the standard functions of international organizations, it has scheduled meetings at a 
propitious time and generated negotiation procedures that have helped the quest for 
compromise solutions. Moreover, it has occasionally entered the debate as a capable actor 
itself: during the negotiations on the protection of the ozone layer UNEP’s Executive Director 
Mostafa Tolba abandoned the appearance of impartiality and began to refer to ‘UNEP’s 
interests’. He judiciously used UNEP’s organizational powers and scientific knowledge to 
push for an adequate international agreement (D’Anieri 1995: 165–66). Finally, the case of 
the Regional Seas Programmes illustrates the possibility of overall leadership responsibility. 
Six of the 13 Regional Seas projects are directly administered by UNEP and have been reliant 
on its diplomatic skill and scientific argumentation as well as on a constant stream of funding 
(DeSombre 2006). 
Yet, a thorough assessment of the programmes’ results yields a picture that is symptomatic 
of UNEP’s general record over the last decades: marked environmental improvement is 
difficult to ascertain, even if the measures agreed have surely helped to slow the pace of 
deterioration. ‘[U]seful but not dramatic work’ (ibid.: 19) may well be a fitting description of 
both the Regional Seas Programmes and UNEP’s impact on the wider area of global 
environmental governance. More joint planning and activities with its sister agency UNDP 
would arguably enhance the financial and political clout of the environmental sector in 
international politics. 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP) 
 
Although the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is neither by mandate nor in 
practice predominantly geared towards environmental protection, its financial importance for 
tackling associated issues at the project level is undeniable. In 2005, 11% of the Programme’s 
US $3,000m. portfolio were spent on projects under the label of ‘Energy and Environment’, 
equalling $326m. (UNDP 2006: 4) – which is more than UNEP’s total funding for the same 
period. The UNDP dates back to a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
November 1965. It was given the mandate to assist capacity-building in developing countries 
with a view to pursuing key objectives, which today include poverty eradication, democratic 
governance, crisis prevention and recovery, as well as combating HIV/AIDS. With 3,300 staff 
located at headquarters in New York or in one of the Programme’s 135 country offices, and 
with field activities in 166 countries, UNDP is the largest existing multilateral organization 
for technical assistance and co-operation (Biermann and Bauer 2004: 7). 
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UNDP’s environmental role is largely defined by its function as an implementing agency 
of associated global funding mechanisms, namely the issue-specific Montreal Protocol’s 
Multilateral Fund or the cross-cutting Global Environment Facility (GEF). Receiving 30% of 
the former’s funding, UNDP has supported the phasing out of ozone-depleting substances in 
developing countries through technical assistance, direct investment, feasibility studies and 
demonstration projects (DeSombre 2006: 115). UNDP’s role in the GEF has so far seen the 
management of 1,750 projects in more than 155 developing countries. To finance such 
projects, in 2005 alone, UNDP secured $284.5m. from the GEF, but also attracted $1,020m. 
in co-financing from governments and donors (UNDP 2006: 16). The environmental 
reputation of the Programme also rests upon renowned initiatives, for instance the Capacity 
21 programme for storing and disseminating ecological data in developing countries, or the 
$1.7m. MDG Carbon Initiative, launched in February 2007, to install a pilot carbon trading 
scheme in China. 
Due to these diverse and widespread field activities, UNDP has rightfully been praised as 
‘a pragmatic complement to UNEP’s global environmental treaty-making efforts’, thereby 
promoting the idea of ‘mainstreaming’, i.e. the integration of environmental concerns into its 
development agenda (WRI 2003: 144). However, this assessment needs to be balanced by 
considering ongoing interagency tensions and turf wars within the UN environmental 
machinery. Despite common projects with UNEP (e.g. the 2007 launch of the Poverty and 
Environment Facility to support the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in five African 
countries), observers have pointed to a historically grown lack of co-ordination which ‘pre-
dates the integrative concept of sustainable development’ (Biermann and Bauer 2004: 19). 
Given continuous internal reforms, a significant rise of non-core resources, and several shifts 
in environmental priorities over the last decade (ibid.: 9, 20), it remains to be seen to what 
extent the Programme can both follow its mainstreaming approach and achieve a better 
division of labour with UNEP. 
 
 
WORLD BANK 
 
A quite different approach to multilateral development assistance has been adopted by the 
World Bank. Unlike UNDP’s grants-based assistance, the World Bank – as well as four 
regional multilateral development banks – supports projects with loans to be repaid. 
Moreover, the World Bank features a lower level of inclusion of developing countries and 
non-governmental organizations with regard to decision-making or disclosure of information. 
Since its establishment in 1944 under the name of ‘International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’ (IBRD), the Bank has steadily expanded and today comprises a closely 
associated group of five development institutions with up to 185 members. Its mission has 
gradually evolved from post-war reconstruction in the early days to world-wide poverty 
alleviation – hence also touching upon environmental issues. In 2005, the Bank spent US 
$2,490m. on environmental 
and natural resource management, equalling 11% of its overall portfolio.
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Apart from this extensive lending for environmental projects, some of the Bank’s success 
stories are owed to its capacity for ‘convening governments and setting guidelines’ (WRI 
2003: 143). Examples for this effective ‘soft law’ approach range from the initiation of a 
dialogue among logging industry leaders on sustainable forestry in 1998 to the ‘Equator 
Principles’, i.e. environmental investment-guiding criteria based on World Bank standards. 
Another prominent case is the launch of a multi-stakeholder dialogue which led to the 1998 
creation of the World Commission on Dams. The commission released principles and 
guidelines on future water and energy decision-making; notably, however, the principles were 
later rejected by the Bank’s Board of Directors (ibid.: 170; Dingwerth 2005). 
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On the other hand, the Bank has attracted strong criticism for its contradictive agenda, 
mainly because some of its conventional projects (for instance the promotion of the use of 
fossil fuels) can severely undermine the positive results achieved with GEF funding 
(DeSombre 2006: 160). Critics have also pointed out that the Bank’s lending policy is biased 
towards economic profit, which creates difficulties for many environmental projects on 
problems resulting from unpriced externalities (ibid.: 157). Moreover, the practice of drafting 
so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) for recipient countries has been 
interpreted by UNDP as a redressed version of the Bank’s highly controversial structural 
adjustment conditionalities (Biermann and Bauer 2004: 11). 
 
 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF) 
 
Mistrust towards a potentially hidden conditionality has also accompanied another 
multilateral environmental financing institution: the Global Environment Facility. Having 
been inspired by discussions in the World Bank, the Facility’s pilot phase between 1991 and 
1994 saw continuous tensions between developing countries and the USA over structural 
reforms (DeSombre 2006: 157). The result of these debates was a new type of international 
institution, ‘an amalgamation of traditional features of UN and Bretton Woods institutions’ 
(Streck 2002: 130ff.). As an open-ended funding mechanism for global environmental issues, 
the Facility is more transparent and democratic than the World Bank thanks to a double voting 
system, independent reviews and a significant participation of over 700 NGOs (WRI 2003: 
153). Further distance to the World Bank was assured by designing GEF as a provider of 
grants – instead of loans – and by naming UNEP and UNDP as additional implementing 
agencies. 
The Facility is mandated to finance incremental costs, i.e. new and additional funding 
which would not have been provided by other sources. This guideline has been criticized as 
failing to address ‘the underlying political causes of environmental degradation in developing 
countries’ (DeSombre 2006: 160). This notwithstanding, between 1991 and 2004, the GEF 
allocated an impressive total of US $6,800m. in grants, and could also leverage another 
$24,000m. in co-funding by governments, international organizations and private entities. 
With these resources, the Facility has supported over 1,900 projects in more than 160 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition.
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 More than half of this 
money was invested in the domains of the two Rio conventions – biodiversity loss and 
climate change – followed by four other GEF focal areas: international waters, ozone 
depletion, land degradation and persistent organic pollutants. 
The GEF deserves special credit for this allocation record. Furthermore, after its early 
restructuring, the Facility has undoubtedly become one of the most adaptive and transparent 
international institutions and displays a relatively high degree of North-South co-operation. 
Despite these achievements, it still has a difficult standing among some of its 177 members. 
Resistance to its work originates from both camps: whereas some of its sponsors have 
repeatedly failed to meet their funding obligations, some of the recipients resist the increasing 
scope of the Facility’s activities and are unwilling to distribute funds among too many focal 
areas (DeSombre 2006: ibid.). In light of this opposition, some critics have voiced doubts 
about the Facility’s innovative impulses. The GEF has to make considerable co-ordinative 
efforts in order to preserve a reasonably peaceful working relationship between implementing 
agencies and associated organizations – a role which does not grant much leeway for 
supporting experimental or cutting-edge projects. On a final cautionary note, whether or not 
specific projects can count as successes, the GEF’s role has sometimes been criticized for 
‘greenwashing’ the impact of the World Bank’s ongoing investment practices (Young 2002). 
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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 
 
History 
As compared to the above institutions, the WTO is different in several regards: first of all, as a 
‘related organization’ it is independent and hence far more detached from the UN system than 
programmes, such as UNEP or UNDP, and specialized agencies like the World Bank
6
 or the 
GEF which is administered by the former three. Moreover, the WTO has no proactive 
environmental mandate, neither for financial nor technical assistance. Its environmental role is 
exerted in an ex post or indirect manner, which none the less has significant impact due to the 
organization’s considerable enforcement capacities. 
This does not imply that environmental issues have not materialized in the organization’s 
structure or documents. In fact, sustainable development is recognized as a key objective in 
the preamble of the WTO agreement. And institutional arrangements date back to pre-WTO 
times: in November 1971, on the verge of the UNCHE conference, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established the Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade (EMIT) in order to account for the trade implications of environmental 
policies. None the less, due to a lack of requests from the contracting parties, the EMIT never 
convened in the first 20 years after its establishment. It was thus only the late 1980s which 
saw a second environmental debate take place within the architecture of the GATT. This 
second debate ‘came at an awkward time for GATT signatories, since the Uruguay Round 
entered a deep crisis in the early 1990s and the agricultural dispute between the USA and the 
EU threatened to scupper the talks’ (Santarius et al. 2004: 10). Though advocated by major 
industrialized countries, any comprehensive approach to ecological standards was blocked by 
developing countries who interpreted them as a disguise for protectionist measures (Eglin 
1998: 252). 
 
 
Structure and Activities 
The major institutional manifestation of the WTO’s environmental role is the Committee on 
Trade and Environment (CTE). The committee has a standing agenda and includes all current 
150 WTO members as well as several observers from intergovernmental organizations (but 
not from NGOs) who gather at least two times a year for formal meetings plus further 
informal ones if needed. Its chief mandate is to ensure a positive interaction between trade 
and environment measures inside and outside WTO law – and to recommend appropriate 
modifications to the latter where necessary. The CTE is supported by the WTO Secretariat’s 
Trade and Environment Division which provides technical assistance to WTO members, 
reports to them about discussions in other intergovernmental organizations and maintains 
contact with non-governmental actors. 
Despite these bodies and their mandates, it is not accurate to speak of a proper WTO 
environmental policy. The Trade and Environment Division is merely performing a service 
function while the WTO Secretariat has not been endowed with any competency to set its own 
environmental agenda (Bernauer 1999: 132ff.). Similarly, the CTE is anything but proactive 
on ecological matters: first of all, the committee’s mandate is not to tackle free trade’s impact 
on the environment; instead, it is supposed to act under exactly reversed premises and address 
the effects of environmental measures on trade policy (Santarius et al. 2004: 48). Second, the 
CTE does not consist of independent agents but of governmental representatives and its 
reports rest upon consensual decision-making. This lack of environmental momentum from 
within the WTO was desired by its creators, bearing justice to concerns voiced by developing 
countries who feared a ‘green’ conditionality for market access. 
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Given these intended shortcomings, the environmental agenda of the WTO is mostly 
shaped through a different channel: via the conflict of WTO law with domestic and 
international environmental regulations, and via the respective judicial interpretation and 
settlement of these conflicts (cf. Zelli 2006). In terms of quantity, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) has constantly broadened its ecological agenda over the years—
through decisions on topics ranging from species protection via air pollution to consumer and 
health standards. This development mirrors the general extension of jurisdictional scope 
during the transition from GATT to WTO: today, no fewer than 60 legal instruments under 
the auspices of the WTO cover a multitude of different policy fields, from agriculture to 
labour rights or from international finance to telecommunications (cf. Sampson 2005: 128ff.). 
The DSB and its two-layered system – consisting of the Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) – 
cannot issue reports on their own initiative, but the member states can invoke the DSB in 
order to block the implementation of other countries’ ecological policies. Hence, the DSB 
substantially differs from the WTO’s political bodies because it is not caught in a stalemate 
among countries and can reach final decisions through independent procedures. 
In terms of substance and quality, one can observe an increasing tendency towards more 
flexible and integrative decisions. This concerns two key types of contested environmental 
standards: on the one hand, the precautionary principle, for instance addressed in a famous 
case on beef treated with hormone growth promoters (1998); and, on the other hand, 
provisions related to production methods, for example the US import bans based on fishing 
methods. Such non-trade preoccupations have gradually become integrated into the decisions 
– either through demands for multilateral negotiations and agreements in order to specify 
WTO law (as in the 1998 US – Shrimp report)7 or through the recognition of the actual 
objectives of trade-restrictive measures (especially health issues, as in the EC – Asbestos 
decision). However, given increasing protests by WTO members about the Appellate Body’s 
flexible interpretation of the agreement (Sampson 2002: 23), only time will tell whether this 
tendency towards more environmentally sound rulings will prevail. 
Apart from these conflicts over domestic environmental regulations, a number of 
noteworthy overlaps exist between WTO law and multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs). Some of the trade-related measures of the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion, for 
instance, collide with the WTO principle of most favoured nation treatment ‘by banning the 
import of various substances on the basis of the status of the country of origin’ (Werksman 
2001: 183). Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol might get into conflict with WTO law on a number 
of aspects, one of them being its constraints on the trade in carbon emissions (Chambers 
2001: 103). 
 
 
Evaluation 
It is crucial to deny the merely theoretical character of WTO-MEA conflicts on two grounds: 
first, the current lack of legal disputes may be due to the fact that the majority of the MEAs in 
question have only been adopted within the last 15 years, and some of them have either not 
yet or only recently entered into force. Second, although there are no judicial controversies, 
the shadow of WTO law and its strong dispute settlement system may well provoke 
anticipatory conflicts or 
‘chilling effects’ (Stillwell and Tuerk 1999, Eckersley 2004), whereby MEA negotiators 
refrain from specifying more ambitious trade-relevant measures or face a country’s refusal to 
ratify an agreement or protocol (Pauwelyn 2003: 237ff.). 
At present, any solution or regulation of these conflicts and overlaps between WTO law 
and domestic or international environmental rules seems improbable. There have been several 
initiatives, including a 1999 co-operation agreement among WTO and UNEP secretariats 
which launched a regular exchange of information on legal issues. Moreover, a ‘trade and 
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environment’ section has been included in the WTO’s 2001 Doha Declaration (Articles 31-
33). Article 32 extended the CTE’s mandate towards ‘the effect of environmental measures on 
market access’, the environmentally relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement (which, for 
instance, overlap with CBD rules on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing) and 
‘labelling requirements for environmental purposes’. Pursuant to this explicit request for 
compatibility, a CTE Special Session (CTESS) was to discuss a number of models for 
harmonizing WTO law and the trade-related measures of MEAs. However, mirroring the 
overall crisis of the Doha Round, the first CTESS as well as its follow-up meetings – e.g. on 
the liberalization of environmental goods and services – have stimulated little agreement 
among WTO members on the further co-ordinative process. 
 
 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
The previous sections have introduced major, globally operating international organizations 
and bodies which either have an environmental mandate or have otherwise exerted significant 
influence on environmental issues and policies. With the exception of the WTO, all of these 
organizations represent core components or affiliated institutions of the United Nations 
system. In addition, Table 1 lists a number of further international organizations engaged in 
environment- 
related activities.
8
 Not surprisingly, these organizations are also linked to the UN. All but the 
last two have the status of a specialized agency (i.e. of an autonomous organization working 
with the UN). 
 
 
 
Table 1: Selected International Organisations with Environmental Activities 
Organization Est. Function Website 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) 
1945 FAO is the lead UN agency responsible for assessing 
the state of global agriculture, forests, fisheries, and for 
promoting sustainable development and harvest of these 
resources. 
www.fao.org 
United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) 
1945 UNESCO promotes collaboration among nations 
through education, science, culture, and communication 
in order to further universal respect for justice, for the 
rule of law, and for human rights. 
www.unesco.org 
United Nations Industrial 
Development 
Organization (UNIDO) 
1966 UNIDO works to strengthen industrial capacities of 
developing and transition nations with an emphasis on 
promoting cleaner and sustainable industrial processes. 
www.unido.org 
International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) 
1957 The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for 
scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use 
of nuclear technology, promoting nuclear safety and 
non-proliferation. 
www.iaea.org 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
1948 The IMO is responsible for improving maritime safety 
and preventing pollution from ships. 
www.imo.org 
World Health 
Organization (WHO) 
1948 The WHO catalyzes international co-operation for 
improved health conditions, including a healthy 
www.who.int 
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environment. 
World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) 
1950 The WMO co-ordinates scientific efforts in global 
weather forecasting and conducts research on air 
pollution, climate change, ozone depletion, and tropical 
storms. 
www.wmo.ch 
United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) 
1969 The UNFPA assists countries in providing reproductive 
health and family planning services, formulates 
population strategies, and advocates for issues related to 
population, reproductive health, and the empowerment 
of women. 
www.unfpa.org 
Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 
(IPCC) 
1988 The IPCC was established under the auspices of UNEP 
and the WMO to assess scientific, technical, and socio-
economic information relevant for the understanding of 
climate change, its potential impacts, and options for 
adaptation and mitigation. 
www.ipcc.ch 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The international bodies and agencies which have been portrayed in this essay differ with 
regard to several dimensions, including the breadth of their mandate (environmental 
protection, sustainable development, or non-environmental issues) as well as their agenda and 
predominant policy approach (funding, technical assistance, rule setting or rule enforcement, 
etc.). Another distinctive criterion is the position of these organizations with respect to the 
United Nations; it is intriguing that – with the exception of the WTO – all of them are 
somehow linked to the UN system, albeit in different roles. Hence the observed variety of 
organizations in global environmental governance is mostly rooted in the complexity of the 
UN environmental machinery which, in turn, ‘reflects the complexity and diversity of 
environmental issues themselves’ (WRI 2003: 141). This observation notwithstanding, one 
should not judge this decentralized arrangement as an inevitable necessity, let alone welcome 
it as an overtly harmonious ‘symphony’ of organizations (ibid.: 139). For sure, the variety of 
platforms has produced numerous benefits, among them: raising awareness and generating 
information on a range of environmental problems and policies, mobilizing expertise from 
scientists and NGOs, providing international negotiating fora, making significant 
contributions to international environmental law, and building capacities to implement 
environmental policies in the developing world (ibid.: 141ff.). 
Yet, on the other hand, the institutional fragmentation implies overlapping mandates and, 
more importantly, it entails considerable shortcomings in coordination: more often than not, 
the various institutions have restricted cooperation to a well-defined number of issues, and 
inter-agency ‘turf battles’ over competencies and resources are a constant occurrence. Most 
prominently, ‘other UN bodies have refused to accept UNEP’s mandate to co-ordinate all 
environmental activities in the UN system due to ‘institutional seniority’. A number of UN 
agencies [. . .] possessed environmental responsibilities before UNEP was created and thus 
feel less of a need to defer to UNEP’ (Ivanova 2005: 25). Apart from the high transaction 
costs arising from such institutional incoherence, this patchwork is not capable of playing the 
role of a strong advocate for global environmental concerns vis-à-vis governments or non-
environmental organizations. As a result, the various bodies of the UN environmental 
machinery have to compete for scarce contributions from national governments, while failing 
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to convince other organizations to open their portfolios more extensively for environmental 
concerns. 
Thus, the two ongoing debates on global environmental governance we mentioned at the 
outset of this chapter – fragmentation vs. centralization and sectoralization vs. mainstreaming 
– are clearly interrelated. Merging both discussions has inspired calls for a centralized and 
cross-cutting World Sustainable Development Organization, or, with less mainstreaming zeal, 
for a UN Environment Organization – a centralized, but issue-specific authority (Biermann 
and Bauer 2006). This chapter has implicitly made a similar case, by sketching the strong 
impact of the world trade regime on a largely toothless mosaic of environmental institutions 
and regulations. However, the section on the WTO has also revealed that creating a 
centralized counterweight is no reliable panacea. The WTO itself has repeatedly been dogged 
by conflict among its member states, quite similar to the stalemates which keep undermining 
the co-ordination among multilateral environmental organizations. The real difference is the 
WTO’s strong dispute settlement mechanism which can temporarily circumvent such 
standstill and exerts an unprecedented influence on domestic and international policies. Thus, 
in order to play an effective role in ‘Earth system governance’ (Biermann 2007), a future 
world environment organization would need to be endowed with comparable dispute 
settlement and enforcement capacities. 
Meanwhile, on a less ambitious but more realistic scale, international environmental 
organizations should try to maximize the synergistic potentials of their overlapping tasks. 
They could do so through enhanced mainstreaming and division of labour at the project level, 
and through bolder co-operation agreements at the organizational level. In addition, striving 
for cross-issue package deals among country coalitions might break negotiation impasses 
within and between organizations: governments could more actively link environmental 
issues with non-environmental concerns – especially with issues of ‘high politics’ such as 
security or trade. Undoubtedly, such integrative or mainstreaming attempts will have to walk 
a thin tightrope: improving inter-organizational coordination while making sure that the 
environmental component is not diluted or absorbed by other concerns. 
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 Africa (16 seats), Asia (13), Eastern Europe (6), Latin America and Caribbean (10), Western Europe and others 
(13). 
3
 These figures are based on a personal communication from UNEP and refer to its own statistics from 31 
December 2005. The annual budget includes all sources of funding, demonstrating the importance of ear-marked 
funds if compared with the size of the Environment Fund. 
4
 http://www.worldbank.org [03/04/2007]. This figure ranks even higher when accounting for environmental 
implications of other World Bank projects: while, in 2000, the Bank had officially spent $1,830m. on projects 
under 
the label of ‘environmental and natural resource management’, the World Resources Institute assumes an overall 
portfolio of $5,000m. in environmental projects for the same year (WRI 2003: 152). 
5
 http://www.gefweb.org [03/04/2007]. 
6
 Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations working with the UN through ECOSOC 
(http://www.un.org/aboutun/ [03/03/2007]). 
7
 These decisions were partly based on ‘general exceptions’ which two WTO agreements grant for measures 
protecting human, animal or plant life or conserving natural resources (Article XX GATT and Article XIV 
GATS 
[General Agreement on Trade in Services]). 
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